The Allied electronic and SEAD campaign in the Gulf saw the
destruction of an air defence system very similar to that of the Warpac. This was achieved
by a carefully structured mix of hard kill and soft kill assets, applied to the task from
a position of fully understanding the objectives and dynamics of the electronic battle.
The superb results of the campaign are directly attributable to
Allied preparation and capability, and the latter we will now examine more closely.
USN/USMC Hard Kill Assets - The
F/A-18, A-7E, EA-6B and HARM
The numerically most significant players in the Allied SEAD
campaign were the US Navy's strike and electronic warfare aircraft. The nature of naval
strike has traditionally forced a strong emphasis on Electronic Combat and this has
reflected in the US Navy adopting a policy whereby all strike aircraft are equipped to
carry the AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile.
The Texas Instruments AGM-88 is a development of a seventies
program to improve on the Vietnam era Shrike ARM. The HARM became operational with the
USN's A-7E in 1984, and is a substantial 800 lb missile with a range well in excess of 10
NM and a speed in excess of Mach 2. The important aspect of HARM is its intelligent (Texas
Instruments) broadband seeker, which covers frequencies from the lower microwave band well
into the upper J band, and is quite capable of sorting, identifying and prioritising
threats for attack autonomously. High directional accuracy is achieved with a nose mounted
cavity backed conical spiral antenna, a class of antenna conferring coverage from C to J
band. The autonomous seeker was sought primarily by the USN which could not afford the
luxury of dedicated SEAD platforms, therefore every aircraft was seen as a potential
platform.
Unlike conventional guided munitions, the HARM must communicate
with the aircraft's radar warning (or homing) equipment and the aircraft's crew, therefore
the missile is supported by a dedicated launch computer, the Command Launch Computer (CLC)
in USN/USMC service and the Aircraft Launcher Interface Computer (ALIC) in USAF F-16
aircraft, tied typically to the aircraft's Mil-Std-1553B digital databus. Via a bus the
CLC/ALIC receives data from the missile and the aircraft's EW systems, and in turn sends
messages to the mission computer for display to the crew. A typical installation is that
in the F/A-18, which employs a LAU-118/A launcher attached to a BRU-32/A bomb rack, the
LAU-118 providing the required umbilical interface to the HARM.
Tied to the CLC the HARM has three basic modes of operation. In
Self Protect Mode the missile is locked onto an emitter which it is cued to by the launch
aircraft's onboard receiver, in Target of Opportunity Mode the HARM autonomously searches
for targets which are displayed to the pilot by the Command Launch Computer, and finally
in Prebriefed Mode the weapon is fired against a planned target. The USAF F-16 ALIC
supports three modes, Position-known (POS), Launch-Off-RWR (LOR) and HARM-as-Sensor (HAS),
similar to corresponding USN/USMC modes.
Only aircraft fitted with the CLC/ALIC and with appropriate
software to interface the mission/fire control computers to the CLC/ALIC can fire the
weapon, others cannot.
Once launched the HARM will home in on the selected emitter and
detonate either on impact or near miss, earlier models fitted with a conventional blast
fragmentation warhead, newer models (AGM-88C-1) with a prefragmented tungsten case warhead
designed to perforate radar vans with tumbling high velocity fragments, to kill personnel
and electronic equipment rather than simply strip off antennas and aerials, allowing later
repair. The HARM uses a Motorola DSU-19 active optical proximity fuse. The weapon is
fitted with a strapdown inertial navigator and in range known modes will fly a range
optimising profile. If the target emitter goes off the air, it will search for other
threats and attack the highest value emitter to be found. Models including and subsequent
to the AGM-88B employ EEPROM Electrically erasable PROM) threat libraries.
The USN's principal HARM shooters were the F/A-18s, which also
comprised a large part of the USMC fixed wing contingent. Smaller numbers of A-7Es and
A-6Es also carried the weapon, as did a substantial fraction of the EA-6B Prowler
contingent.
The F/A-18 installation uses target information from the HARM's
nose mounted seeker and the aircraft's omni-directional ALR-67 warning receiver, the pilot
is provided with a list of targets in descending order of priority displayed on one of the
cockpit CRTs, targets are selected with a throttle mounted switch which sequences through
the list. The ALR-67 combines both crystal video and superhet receiver hardware and
complements the coverage of the HARM, it is however a very basic system in comparison with
specialised homing receiver installations such as the USAF APR-38/47 in the F-4G. As such
the composite installation provides omnidirectional coverage with low directional
accuracy, and forward sector coverage with high directional accuracy due the seeker of the
HARM.
The most sophisticated USN/USMC installation is that of the
EA-6B, which integrates the HARM into the aircraft's comprehensive ALQ-99 tactical jamming
system (see AA 1/89). The EA-6B is equipped with a comprehensive suite of warning and
homing receivers and carries specialist operators, this allows highly selective targeting
of the HARM against radars and operators which might elude the more basic systems operated
by pilots and bombardier/navigators in strike aircraft. This difference in capability is
most apparent in a high threat density environment, where the workload associated with
selecting and targeting a specific emitter can be excessive for an aircraft with a less
capable warning receiver system, and less qualified operator.
The USN's commitment to fitting aircraft with HARM reflected in
workload, with 60% of the total number of SEAD missions flown during the war claimed by
the USN, which provided escort jamming and SEAD for many mixed strike packages.
USAF Hard Kill - The F-4G, F-16C and
HARM
The USAF deployed its dedicated F-4G Wild Weasel (see AA 7/86) to
the Gulf, the lineal descendent of the Vietnam era Weasels. The F-4G carries the APR-47, a
sophisticated long range homing receiver system designed to locate, identify and track a
wide range of emitters in a high density signal environment. Using its interferometric
antenna systems the APR-47 will pinpoint an emitter with high directional accuracy, while
providing continuous real time position data to the HARM missiles carried by the aircraft.
The combination of an accurate direction finding receiver with omnidirectional coverage,
ranging on emitters and the ability to sort and track a large number of emitters
concurrently, with an expert backseat operator provides the F-4G with a uniquely potent
capability to selectively target and attack emitters. This capability is enhanced by the
ability to feed targeting information to other suitably equipped aircraft.
The F-4G/APR-47 supports HARM in two modes, Pre-Emptive (PE), a
range known standoff mode, and Direct Attack (DA) a range known or unknown mode with short
reaction time. Both modes support off-axis launches.
Initial deployment saw the 561st TFS of the 35th TFW deploy from
George AFB in California to Sheikh Isa in Bahrain, followed by 12 aircraft of the 81st TFS
of the 52nd TFW at Spangdahlem, and later a further 12 from the 480th TFS of the 52nd,
these attached to the 35th TFW (provisional) to form a composite wing. The 23rd TFS of the
52nd deployed its mixed F-4G/F-16C force to Incirlik in Turkey. In mixed force operations,
the F-16Cs, which are fitted for HARM, fly air-air escort for the F-4Gs and carry HARMs to
hit prebriefed targets, leaving the difficult mobile targets to the F-4Gs.
The F-4Gs were most active in the first three days of the war,
when targets abounded and the Iraqis were not shy about turning on their equipment. At
this point in time the Weasels were a designated 'go/no-go' item for a strike package, ie
no Weasels, no strike. The aircraft concentrated on area defences and point defence SAM
systems, with the earlier discussed objectives.
By the end of the first week the Iraqis realised that the SEAD
campaign was specifically aimed at eradicating their SAM and GCI/EW radar capability and
at that point they deliberately shut down as many systems as they could, dismantling and
camouflaging many of these to avoid attack, while they also started redeploying their
remaining air assets to the North to put them out of the reach of most Allied aircraft.
Once the back of the Iraqi IADS was broken, the Weasel's tactics
shifted toward keeping remaining SAM systems off the air by presence alone, typically a
pair of F-4Gs armed with HARM would patrol an area and escort any strike aircraft
arriving, then withdraw to refuel from a tanker while another pair took its place. These
sorties typically lasted 4 hours, with short 30 minute escort runs alternating with
refuellings.
The USAF Weasel squadrons found an increasing fraction of
aircraft were returning with unfired HARMs due the lack of emissions to guide on, as a
result the aircraft were loaded with bombs, Maverick TV guided missiles and cluster bombs
in addition to HARMs. There were two aspects to this decision, one the diminishing level
of emitter activity which denied targeting, the other the objective of totally destroying
the Iraqis' capability rather than merely stripping off antennas, allowing a radar to be
later repaired or rebuilt.
The Weasels' weapon of choice for suppressing AAA and
non-emitting sites was the CBU-87/B Combined Effects Bomblet (CEB) cluster munition. The
CBU-87 uses a standard SUU-65/B dispenser (ie bomb body) which has canted tail fins which
spin the dispenser up to 2500 RPM after release from the aircraft and fin deployment. An
FZU-37/B Doppler proximity fuse is typically fitted to provide submunition release at a
programmed altitude, the spin of the weapon causes the submunitions to be ejected in a
toroidal pattern about the dispenser. The BLU-97/B fin retarded submunitions have a shaped
charge, combined with a fragmenting case and incendiary element to cause damage across a
broad spectrum of targets.
Of particular interest to the Weasels were SAM launchers and TEL
vehicles which, as non-emitting targets, would not attract HARMs as their guidance radars
did. These were systematically hunted down and destroyed, where ordnance remained the
Weasels expended it against targets of opportunity on the way home.
Toward the end of the campaign emitter activity dropped to zero
and many Weasels were retasked with fighter CAP or strike missions, attacking power
stations, HAS and other targets. A notable mission was a raid by Maverick firing F-4Gs on
the Baiji oil refinery, which left fires active for over a week.
In perspective, USAF Weasel operations more than anything
resembled those of the Vietnam period, with a return to the idea of complete lethal
suppression with a range of munitions (although purists may further argue that the
campaign owes more to RAF/USAAF 2ATAF SEAD operations in June, 1944). The Bahrain based
35th TFW flew 2,331 sorties for 8,587 hours, firing close to 1,000 HARMs and two dozen
AGM-45 Shrikes.
RAF Hard Kill - The Tornado and ALARM
The RAF's ARM is the BAe ALARM, a much newer weapon than the
American HARM, designed with a much broader range of operating modes. Alarm was designed
for SEAD and self-protection of the RAF Tornado, Jaguar and Sea Harrier, although at this
time it is only carried by suitably modified Tornado GR.1s.
The Alarm is like the HARM an intelligent autonomous weapon with
a wideband homing seeker, unlike HARM it can however loiter and thus is a more suitable
weapon for SEAD by non-specialised strike aircraft. Fully programmable in software, the
Alarm is best used by 1553B bus equipped aircraft where the fire control or EW system can
directly interact with the weapon until launch, if necessary changing the selection of
target type and position. The missile receives position updates from the launch aircraft
until launch. The Alarm has four principal operating modes.
In Direct Mode the missile is programmed before launch with a
prioritised threat file, it is then fired at the target, even from very low altitudes,
pops up for its programmed mid-course phase, after which it initiates a search within a
programmed box and locks on to the highest priority emitter detected and homes in to
impact. Until the missile is committed to terminal homing it will autonomously change its
selection of target if a higher value emitter is detected.
In Dual Mode the Alarm will maximise the time during which it can
threaten an emitter. If the emitter is radiating the Alarm will attack as in direct mode,
if it shuts down, the Alarm will proceed to a point above the emitter where it deploys a
parachute and loiters (UK sources indicating a climb to 70,000 ft). If the emitter turns
on, the parachute is jettisoned and the Alarm dives into the target.
In Loiter Mode the Alarm directly proceeds above the target and
deploys its parachute, loitering until the emitter is activated.
In Corridor/Area Suppression Mode the Alarm is fired in the
direction of emitters, the position of which may not be precisely known. The missile then
autonomously selects the highest priority target for attack.
The Alarm is substantially lighter than HARM at 583 lb, allowing
a better load on typical defence suppression aircraft. It employs a strapdown inertial
navigation unit in addition to the radar homing seeker, and is fitted with a preformed
fragmentation warhead for maximum lethality.
The RAF had a total of nine Tornado GR.1s fitted for Alarm in the
Gulf, nearly all 'borrowed' from 9 Sqn, but flown by crews from 20 Sqn. The aircraft flew
from Tabuk in Saudi Arabia. A typical load was three rounds on fuselage stations.
Typical missions involved Alarm launches by SEAD aircraft on
separate axes to the inbound strike force, with the missiles fired in loiter mode. Typical
deliveries involved a short pullup before weapon launch, after which the missile would
steeply climb to its station. Reports suggest that pilots unfamiliar with the weapon were
often alarmed (no pun intended) at the sight of the missile streaking upwards from low
altitude, believing it to be a SAM.
In total, the RAF flew 24 Alarm missions, comprising 52 sorties
during which 121 rounds were fired. The supply of missiles was exhausted by mid February,
after which the SEAD mission was delegated to USAF Weasels. By that time there was little
Iraqi emitter activity remaining.
Support Jammers - the EA-6B, EF-111A
and EC-130 Compass Call
The most potent support jammers in the campaign were the USN/USMC
EA-6B Prowlers, which provided coverage across all bands. The USAF's EF-111As missed out
on a planned upgrade to the ALQ-99E due a dispute between the USAF and the prime
contractor, resulting in the cancellation of the upgrade to provide high band coverage.
However, the Iraqi inventory contained a large proportion of older lower band Soviet built
radars for which the existing ALQ-99E was well suited.
Both of these aircraft performed a vital role in the campaign,
flying standoff jamming and escort jamming for strike packages of USAF, RAF, Saudi,
Italian and USN/USMC aircraft. So important were the support jammers in the opening phase
of the battle, that they were designated a 'go/no-go' item in a strike package. The USN
deployed a total of 27 Prowlers and the Marines 12 (VMAQ-2), with the USAF deploying
Ravens from both the 390th and 42nd ECS' at Taif and Incirlik.
The Ravens and Prowlers provided noise and deception jamming of
GCI/EW and acquisition and tracking radars to prevent these from providing targeting
information to SAM systems, in addition some Prowlers would have also provided
communications jamming against GCI and SAM VHF/UHF communications links using their low
band ALQ-149 pods, also effective against low band radars such as the Spoon Rest. As a
result, the Iraqi SAM systems were unable to concentrate and coordinate their fire on
individual targets, if they could even identify these.
An interesting aspect of support jamming operations was the
standoff jamming provided to penetrating F-117A Stealth Fighters. The commonly held belief
that stealth aircraft are invisible to radar is wrong, they are merely less detectable.
Similarly the belief that stealth aircraft cannot benefit from jamming is equally wrong
(see AA 12/90, 5/87). What a jammer offers is such a reduction in defending radar
sensitivity to render an otherwise detectable inbound stealth aircraft effectively
invisible, by burying its return in noise. This was successfully accomplished on a number
of raids when support jammers radiated as the F-117As closed on the target, concealing
them totally. According to some sources, this practice was later discontinued as it was
found that the Iraqis commenced firing blind barrage AAA once jamming was detected,
although given the operating altitude of the F-117A this was unlikely to have been an
issue.
The only casualty of the campaign was an EF-111A, which impacted
the ground while evading a SAM at low level near the Saudi border. Sadly the crew died
when the ejection capsule failed.
The EC-130 Compass Call aircraft provided communications jamming
of GCI links and command links to SAM and AAA systems, forcing the Iraqis to rely on
landlines of substantially lower bandwidth. These aircraft worked long hours, standing off
near the boundaries of Iraqi airspace and pouring garbage into Iraq's airwaves. While not
receiving the coverage of the fast jet support jammers, the EC-130s performed a vital role
particularly in the early phase of the conflict.
The role of the support jammers in the campaign has been
overshadowed by the stunningly successful lethal SEAD campaign, however we must not
overlook the fact that the the low aggregate attrition is directly attributable to support
jamming, particularly in the early phase of the SEAD campaign when the Iraqis retained
sufficient assets to saturate the escorting SEAD aircraft with targets. Any attrition
warfare campaign takes time to be effective, ie the results are never instantaneous, and
the use of soft kill support jamming provides a most useful buffer by inhibiting hostile
air defence capability until attrition reaches a decisive level. The support jamming
campaign must therefore be judged as much a success as the SEAD campaign, were it
otherwise the attrition figures would be much different.
Defensive Electronic Counter Measures
The final aspect of the three pronged Allied strategy was the
application of Defensive ECM (DECM) to protect Allied aircraft from those SAMs which
penetrated the jamming and SEAD coverage of the strike packages.
Many of the aircraft deployed in the theatre lacked internal ECM.
All USN tactical aircraft carried internal jammers, in most instances the Sanders ALQ-126A
or B trackbreakers, supplemented by the ALQ-162 trackbreaker.
The ALQ-126B is a power managed jammer with coverage up to the
I/J bands, capable of delivering in excess of 1 kW power per band at 4-5% duty cycles. A
trackbreaker designed to defeat pulse mode SAM and AAA radars, the ALQ-126B modes include
mainlobe blanking, inverse con-scan, range-gate pull-off and swept square wave which make
it particularly potent against established Soviet conically scanning systems such as the
SA-6/Straight Flush tracking/illuminating radar or the ZSU-23-4P/Gun Dish fire control
radar. The 126B installation typically uses fore and aft antennas with 60 degree beamwidth
and 15 degree depression to cover surface threats. On many aircraft the 126 is
supplemented by the ALQ-162 which is a specialised continuous wave (CW) trackbreaker
designed to defeat devices such as the SA-6 missile SARH seeker.
All USN/USMC tactical aircraft carried internal warning
receivers, in all instances either the standard ALR-67 or in older aircraft, the ALR-45
and 45F. These receivers are systems which combine crystal video receivers, superhets and
a low band receiver. Four cavity backed spiral antennas are used for threat direction
finding. Some older aircraft have an additional APR-43 Compass Sail/Clockwise C/D band
launch warning receiver, which intercepts and analyses the command uplink signals
associated with SAMs such as the SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. The substantial dependence of Soviet
SAMs upon command uplinks and tracking beacons (see table Part 1) makes for unambiguous
indication of the state of the engagement.
The USN's attention to DECM in tactical aircraft was not matched
by the USAF. Of the USAF's tactical inventory, only the long range F-111 and F-15 carried
internal trackbreakers. The F-15C and E carried derivatives of the basic ALQ-135 TEWS, a
capable system with high band coverage, of which little has been published in open
sources. The F/EF-111A/E/F carried various models of the ALQ-94/137, a combined pulse mode
and CW deception and noise jammer with three subsystems covering low (E/F), mid (G/H) and
high (I/J) bands with fore and in some airframes, aft coverage.
The F-16s, F-4Gs, RF-4Cs and A-10s lacked internal jammers, the
F-16C in particular missing out on the planned upgrade to the internal joint service
ALQ-165 ASPJ. This created much heartache for the USAF, which was left with the task of
distributing its meagre stocks of podded jammers amongst the close to 1,000 aircraft. Of
the newest type, the ALQ-131 Block 2, only 260 were available, supplemented by 130 older
model Block 1 pods which required pilot selection of jamming mode. In addition to the
131s, the USAF also had 250 older ALQ-119s and 50 Vietnam era ALQ-101s, many of which
probably saw action over Hanoi. The F-4Gs were fitted with Raytheon ALQ-184s, which are
upgraded from ALQ-119s.
This situation created much pressure on the SEAD and support
jamming forces, particularly since only the 131 and 184 could cope with newer threats,
thus leaving the F-16s and A-10s otherwise susceptible to fire from weapons such as the
SA-6 and SA-8 or Roland. Fortunately, the MTBF of the newer pods was exemplary, the 131
demonstrating 180 hrs (ie four times design spec) between failures, thus allowing for
little downtime due pod outages.
The Westinghouse ALQ-131(V) is the USAF's standard jamming pod,
evolved from the earlier ALQ-119(V), in turn evolved from the Vietnam era ALQ-101 and
QRC-335 programs. The 131 is designed as a fully modular system, with fully self contained
cooling and support functions. The system is built around a C/I (Control/Interface) module
which contains a digital computer and a programmable digital waveform generator, the
latter feeding an array of jammer modules. The system can be slaved to an aircraft's RWR
or controlled by an internal power management module, and is reported to provide a range
of noise and deception jamming modes.
Raytheon's ALQ-184(V) is a relative newcomer also derived from
the ALQ-119 family. It employs Rotman lense antennas and provides noise and deception
jamming modes, in the latter operating as a deception repeater.
USAF radar warning assets were no less diverse than their DECM
assets. Older tactical aircraft such as the F-4 and A-10 carried versions of the standard
ALR-46 family, capable of handling up to 16 threat emitters concurrently, typically
supplemented by a C/D low band ALR-64 Compass Sail launch warning system. The ALR-46 is a
conventional crystal video receiver with a quartet of cavity backed spiral antennas for
direction finding. The F-16s carried the ALR-69 which is an enhanced ALR-46 with
integrated Compass Sail equipment, and a frequency selective receiver set, the latter
capable of analysing guidance transmissions to determine the direction from which the
missile is approaching.
The F-111s and F-15s carried type specific warning equipment. The
F-15C/E carried the capable E-J band ALR-56C, a dual conversion H/I/J band superhet
receiver, supplemented by an ALQ-128 countermeasures receiver, whereas the F-111E/F
carried the third generation of the C-J band ALR-62 warning and homing system, the current
incarnation including an instantaneous frequency measurement receiver for precision
direction finding. The EF-111A carried a modified subtype, the ALR-62(V)4 with facilities
to 'look through' jamming by the ALQ-99E.
Insofar as can be established from open sources, the USAF and USN
diverge substantially in their respective strategies for the design of DECM systems, the
Navy concentrating on specific trackbreaking techniques designed to defeat fire control
systems, whereas the Air Force places a greater emphasis on generic techniques for
defeating acquisition and fire control radars. While this more than anything reflects the
differences between the naval environment and air-land battle environment, it has the
benefit of presenting an opponent with a diverse array of jamming techniques to cope with.
In the Gulf this effect was further enhanced by the presence of
the RAF, who employed their own unique DECM equipment. The Tornado GR.1 carried an
internal Marconi Radar Homing and Warning Receiver (RHWR) for threat detection, and the
Skyshadow deception jamming pod. The RHWR covers the C to J bands, and will identify and
classify AI radars, SAM and AAA acquisition and tracking radars and missile guidance
emissions. The system provides long range warning and homing which implies the use of
superhet receivers. The Skyshadow trackbreaker pod will concurrently counter pulse mode
and continuous wave emitters with angle and range denial techniques, and will
automatically prioritise threats and select appropriate jamming techniques and power
levels.
In addition, radar absorbent tiles were attached to the inlets to
provide a useful reduction in frontal radar cross section, to enhance the effect of the
Skyshadow's jamming when closing on a target. The RAF's Jaguars carried the older
ALQ-101-10 jamming pods in addition to an internal RWR. The RAF expended much effort, like
the Americans, in the prewar period to ensure that the threat libraries in the jammers
were up to date. The mix of very old and very new Soviet built equipment, supplemented by
Western equipment, and the unplanned for high/medium altitude operational environment,
resulted in much software development effort to ensure that all threats were covered.
The Allied DECM effort was greatly assisted by the fact, that all
of the threat systems in the theatre were well known (see Part 1), although in hindsight
this would have also been true of a Warpac/NATO conflict, as the Soviets were unlikely to
have deployed the new SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12 in strength to the front line for fear of
compromising them to Allied Elint. The low aggregate loss rate testifies to the
effectiveness of the equipment, as most launched SAMs went ballistic even when guided.
Lessons for Australia
The world has not witnessed an electronic battle of such ferocity
as in the Gulf since the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. Significantly, the Allies'
systematic expenditure on electronic warfighting capability over the last two decades has
yielded substantial dividends. Moreso since the opponent was a good facsimile of the
planned for threat, the Communist Warpac, and had an air defence system of similar density
albeit somewhat lesser capability than the former Western TVD PVO and PVO-SV (army)
deployments. Significantly, most of the systems deployed by the Soviets in Europe were
identical to those in Iraq, or later models of the same types. The notion that the
cumbersome SA-4 and SA-5 systems, and new mobile SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12 would have made up
for the additional numbers and capability of Allied electronic combat assets in that
theatre is hard to support.
What this suggests is that the NATO-Warpac central European air
battle would have probably followed a similar course, leading to the defeat of the
Communists' IADS within a week or so, in turn leading to air superiority in the following
week, as the Communist air forces would have withered under the fire of the Allied
counter-air campaign. Fortunately this never had to happen and the world has been spared
the inevitable nuclear response to the lost air battle and hence total conventional defeat
through attrition by air.
Several interesting observations must be made. First and foremost
is the reality that the electronic battle must precede the opening of the counter-air
battle. The attainment of air superiority requires the attainment of electromagnetic
superiority - who controls the airwaves will control the skies.
There can be no doubt that the established model for the air war,
ie the counter-air battle to achieve command of the air, followed by interdiction
campaigns to inflict attrition, must be expanded by the introduction of an electronic
campaign to cripple the opponent's C3 and IADS, as a precursor to hunting down the
opponent's air capability. It must be noted that while the foremost objective of the
electronic campaign will always be the destruction of the opponent's air defence
capability, by encompassing the opponent's total C3 system as a target for attack one has
advanced the process of the strategic interdiction campaign by implementing its very first
phase concurrently with the electronic campaign.
The Gulf War was so one-sided because the electronic battle was
so lopsided. The US and UK are acknowledged to be the most capable in the West, insofar as
electronic combat capability goes, whereas the Iraqis were utterly inept in the
discipline, if they at all recognised its existence as such. How much blame for Iraq's
defeat must be attributed to Iraqi stupidity at a senior and operational command level,
incompetence at the cutting edge, and how much is due to fundamental flaws in Soviet air
battle doctrine, may be difficult to determine. What is certain is that even extremely
competent air defence forces will not perform well once their C3 network is shattered. A
highly centralised system breeds an inability to function without a C3 network and thus
the effect of removing it exposes the basic limitations of the system. In this fashion
Allied strategists attuned their campaign to a fundamental structural flaw in Warpac air
battle doctrine.
The deluge of jamming and anti-radiation missiles represented
nothing less than a war of attrition against electronic assets. In this respect the
electronic battle has acquired the fundamental characteristic of the air battle, it is a
war of attrition. As such it is a battle where mobility confers a major advantage in
allowing the choice of entering an engagement or not, and that mobility is an attribute of
the attacking air force, weighing heavily in its favour.
An aircraft can jam and dodge a missile, whereas a land based
radar or SAM system can neither jam nor dodge an anti-radiation missile. It can only shut
itself down and by doing so withdraw from the engagement, this unilateral move may not
prevent a SEAD tasked aircraft from locating and destroying the shut down radar. Decoy
emitters only delay the inevitable.
It follows therefore that an air battle doctrine which relies
heavily on ground based radar and SAMs is analogous to a doctrine of static fortification
engaging a manoeuvre land force. Unless the attacking air force is particularly ill
matched to the task, the advantage must lay with the attacker. Historical evidence easily
supports this assertion, the only times when SAM based defences were successful was during
the transient phase of deploying a new technology (SA-2,3 in SEA, SA-6 in Yom Kippur),
once the limitations of the new weapon were understood the war of attrition swung in the
favour of air power. This would have also been true of the SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12 in any
European conflict.
From the Australian perspective several issues become very clear.
Reliance on a static air defence system is a flawed strategy as it forces a defensive
posture where air assets become committed to protecting air defence infrastructure, rather
than winning the offensive counter-air campaign. This may not be clear enough to the
laymen who determine Australia's policy in this area and it is up to those who know to
press this argument vigourously.
Whether an OTHB network such as Jindalee would prove to be more
of an asset than a vulnerability remains to be seen, when compared to a moving and
difficult to hit AEW&C platform. Certainly were it to become Australia's principal
means of detecting inbound threats it would become a very high priority target justifying
the expense of systematic SEAD strikes, cruise missile strikes or special operations
raids. Warning time notwithstanding, defending it would absorb assets.
Similarly the utility of SAM and AAA systems is doubtful. They
cannot prevent air power from inflicting attrition and themselves inflict only
questionable levels of attrition on an attacking force. Where low level SAMs are the only
types available, using PGMs from medium altitudes defeats the SAM and AAA defence totally.
While the ADF is woefully weak in this area, it is worth stating that resources should not
be expended on SAMs or AAA. The payoff is simply not there.
Another issue is that of C3 in the deep North, which has always
been a basic vulnerability of the ADF. Any opponent who is serious will target the fixed
C3 sites and in doing so will make life very difficult for the ADF. There is reasonable
justification for equipping the RAAF's tankers as VHF/UHF/satellite communications relay
platforms/command posts to provide some additional redundancy over fixed installations
(not unlike the RAF's tankers), as is there a case for further redundancy via mobile
satellite communications terminals above what is projected.
The vulnerability of our national C3 network is something to
seriously ponder, should we ever become embroiled in a neighbourhood brawl. Distances what
they are, crippling our C3 network could allow an opponent substantial freedom of
operations in the North. Lacking anything even approaching an IADS, the issue of its
crippling isn't really applicable, but selective air strikes or special operations raids
on the Jindalee and primary radar facilities could have a similar effect should we become
too reliant on them. The reality is that static systems are targets which can't run away
and therefore cannot be expected to survive for long unless disproportionate resources are
assigned to defend them.
What must be seriously questioned is the ADF's failure to commit
to the development of a substantial support jamming and SEAD capability. If such a program
exists it is a well kept secret of which there is no visible evidence.
This is in contrast to the RAAF's P-3C ESM program, where the ADF
is gaining a long overdue and substantial capability. In any confrontation the ability to
determine the opponent's electronic order of battle is of paramount importance. Whether
this is achieved by specialist aircraft or by fitting mission consoles and ESM receivers
to P-3Cs is a matter of implementation. A little capability in this area goes a very long
way. The RAAF's recently adopted policy of acquiring EW systems only with full software
support packages is a major step forward, as the ability to update threat libraries
quickly and quietly is fundamental to success in the EW game. EW systems with obsolete or
inappropriate threat libraries are useless ballast. Buying canned systems from overseas
without the software support package is an utter waste of taxpayer's money.
Our defensive electronic warfare capability is by all standards
modest and SEAD capability non-existant. The F-111 and F/A-18 carry defensive ECM and
RWRs, while the P-3 force carries ESM equipment. There are no SEAD or Support Jamming
assets by tasking or functional specialisation and given policy at the time of writing,
they are unlikely to be acquired in the near future. This is a major weakness stemming
from a lack of policy direction, in turn stemming from a lack of understanding in
decisionmaking circles.
While the regional environment could hardly justify a substantial
and dedicated support jamming capability, by the same token if we ever had to go to war
such a capability will be sorely needed. A useful compromise is a capability based on role
specific high power communications and radar jamming pods, carried by standard or modified
tactical aircraft, these pods being targeted at generic and known threat systems. In
particular GCI/EW radars, acquisition radars and VHF/UHF GCI comms links need to be
targeted as the ADF has no capability to do so at this time.
A mix of noise jamming, false target generator and comjam pods
carried by either of the tactical jet types could prove of substantial usefulness
particularly during the crucial opening phase of any conflict. The design of such pods or
modification of existing overseas designs could be a useful way of developing an
indigenous EW manufacturing and support infrastructure.
Another capability worth consideration is an emitter locating
system or homing receiver system, fitted to some of the tactical jet airframes. One
approach would be a centreline pod with a quartet of dual baseline interferometers (eg
conventional 5 x cavity backed spiral), feeding IFM receivers, the whole system thus
capable of 360 degree coverage in operation from D band through J band. Such a pod would
carry a processor to sort, identify and locate emitters based on receiver outputs. The pod
could be integrated with the aircraft's weapon system via the 1553B mux bus. This would be
a most useful integration and development exercise, insofar as gaining experience goes
(and alternately an airframe specific design could also be built). Export customers need
not be ruled out.
Electronic combat is neither black magic or unattainably
difficult science, it is an established engineering and operational discipline where
success is achieved through systematic effort. The Gulf War demonstrated beyond any doubt
the central importance of electronic combat to the modern air war and those who fail to
take heed today will be tomorrow's losers. Failure to understand the dynamics and strategy
of electronic combat is no longer excusable, and those who resist the acquisition of
capabilities in this area are either stupid or in effect acting against Australia's
interests. The ADF to date has accepted the importance of electronic combat, but we have
yet to see a serious committment of resources. Hopefully this will eventually take place,
if it doesn't we may become the losers in any future conflict. Adequate precedents do
exist.
REFERENCES:
[1] Luti W.J., 'Battle of the Airwaves', USNI Proceedings, 1/1992
[2] Hampton D., 'Combat Defence Suppression', Journal of
Electronic Defence, 10/1991
[3] 'International CounterMeasures Handbook', Cardiff Publishing,
1989, 1991
Table 1 (US Navy Losses)
