The Allied assault on Iraq saw the collapse of a formidable
integrated air defence system, probably the most lethal outside the Warsaw pact. The Iraqi
system had much in common with the Soviet system, including equipment, deployments,
operational doctrine and diversity of types. The ease with which the Allies crippled and
then demolished this system testifies to fundamental flaws in Warpac air battle doctrine,
which would have had a decisive influence in any NATO-Warpac conflict. What follows is how
it was done.
Planning and Preparation
The Allies had monitored the Iraqi IADS closely throughout the
buildup period of Desert Shield, deploying a range of Elint (Electronic Intelligence
gathering) assets to the theatre. These assets served the principal purpose of mapping out
the Iraqi Electronic Order of Battle (EOoB), ie pinpointing the deployments and
composition of Iraq's air defence batteries and supporting radar systems, and mapping out
the stations and frequencies used for command and control of the network.
Key systems employed were various subtypes of the EC/RC-135 Rivet
Joint, the high flying TR-1 (U-2), the US Navy's EP-3 and EKA-3B aircraft and the RAF's
Nimrod R.1. These aircraft were strategically positioned to cover particular sectors of
IADS coverage when Allied aircraft, in the period preceding hostilities, feigned
penetrations of Iraqi airspace. This is the oldest trick in the electronic warfare book
and the Iraqis fell for it repeatedly, lighting up their radars to engage the would be
inbounds, in doing so they provided the monitoring Elint platforms with their positions
and the identities of their radars, in turn betraying the composition of their batteries.
It is also very likely that the Iraqis indulged in the luxury of live testing and
calibration of their radars, further assisting the Allied effort.
With Elint equipment of appropriate capability it is possible to
determine not only the type of emitter, but also often which model or subtype and its
standard of calibration, all from the monitored and recorded emissions.
The Iraqis violated a fundamental principle of electronic combat
by lighting up radars outside of actual engagements, and then not moving or reshuffling
their assets to invalidate Allied reconnaissance. Were they to have done the proper thing,
they would have moved batteries to dummy SAM sites, lit up in the presence of Allied Elint
aircraft, and then shifted the batteries to implement a scheme of tactical or strategic
deception. If this is implemented properly, and appropriate emission control discipline
enforced, it becomes very difficult for the attacking party to map out what the real
structure of the target IADS is. This in turn makes the planning of a pre-emptive strike
very difficult, as with the increasing complexity of the deception the risk of not taking
out all key assets in the initial hit increases vastly.
By the middle of January the Allies had a comprehensive picture
of Iraq's IADS and were well positioned for a knock-out blow against the system, with
substantial hard kill defence suppression assets in the theatre. Key systems were the F-4G
Wild Weasel, a Phantom airframe fitted with a potent radar homing and warning receiver
system (APR-47 RHAWS), which was supplemented by the HARM firing F-16C and F/A-18C. These
aircraft were further supported by Alarm firing Tornado GR.1s of the RAF and HARM capable
EA-6B Prowlers, A-7Es and A-6Es of the USN.
Jamming assets assembled in the theatre included USAF EC-130
Compass Call standoff communications jammers, Naval EA-6B Prowlers and the USAF's EF-111A
Ravens. The protracted buildup was a major benefit to the Allies, who used the time to
upgrade both hardware and software in many of the jamming systems, to precisely match the
Iraqi inventory. Unlike the Israelis in 1973, who carried the wrong jammers and warning
receivers for the threat at hand, the Allies had the best of intelligence and used it to
the fullest.
The Allied planners envisaged a three pronged strategy for
winning the electronic battle, concentrating on the simultaneous implementation of the
following objectives:
- suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) via jamming,
anti-radiation missiles, decoys and precision guided weapons delivered by penetrating
aircraft and standoff platforms.
- crippling the C3 network by jamming with EC-130 Compass Call
aircraft, until key nodes could be destroyed by strike aircraft.
- the use of onboard Defensive ECM by penetrating aircraft to defeat
any SAMs which would get airborne in spite of the preceding activity.
The coup was meticulously planned, with the principal objective
of the first phase of the SEAD campaign being the earliest possible paralysis of the
GCI/EW network via the killing of key radar and C3 sites, this to be achieved by a series
of simultaneous attacks by a range of different aircraft types.
Once the network was paralysed, individual area defences and
point defences would have to light up their local radars to acquire inbound Allied
aircraft and thus expose themselves. The local area defences would then be attacked by
SEAD aircraft attached to inbound strike packages, with the twofold objectives of
preventing attrition of strike aircraft and inflicting attrition upon elements of the
IADS, thus implementing the second phase of the SEAD campaign.
Allied mission planners expended by established standards
unprecedented effort in computer modelling of the initial hours of the campaign [3], an
effort which commenced only several days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Using the
EADSIM/C3ISIM simulation program for analysis, a team of analysts created an extremely
detailed model of the Iraqi IADS, containing performance parameters, kill probabilities
and electromagnetic characteristics of the systems used. Using intelligence sourced from
the DIA and JCS, the team then produced a model for the Iraqi C3 network which tied the
IADS together.
With a model for the Iraqi IADS/C3, the USAF's analysts then
approached the Checkmate high level operational planning group, the strategists
responsible for developing the Allied air war battle plan, and acquired details of the
projected campaign. With the simulation model complete, or as complete as was possible
with the data at hand, the analysts ran the simulation ten times. The results were a
projected attrition no worse than 4% for the initial hours, numbers consistent with rule
of thumb estimations and a simpler TAC Thunder simulation run earlier.
A detailed discussion of Allied simulation effort justifies
treatment in itself, what is significant is that it allowed Allied planners to explore a
range of strategies, unit level tactics and aircraft type deployments before the
commencement of hostilities. When the time came, the Allied battle plan was well
structured and its effects understood in detail, everything happened for specific reasons
at specific times and places.
The 17th January, 1991 - the Coup de
Grace
The Allies struck at about 03:00 hrs local time on the 17th
January, when USAF EF-111A and USN/USMC EA-6B crews hit the radiate switches on their
ALQ-99 consoles, unleashing a torrent of noise and deception jamming signals unto Iraq's
airwaves. Supported by the EC-130s' jamming of all known communications frequencies, the
solid wall of electromagnetic garbage hid multiple waves of inbound strike aircraft and
cruise missiles, while paralysing much of Iraq's communications network.
Cruise missiles and F-117A Stealth Fighters struck at key C3
sites, while the first wave of 12 USAF F-4Gs and 60 USN/USMC F/A-18s, A-7s and EA-6Bs
fired AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles into key air defence radar systems and
strategically positioned SAM sites. The weight of the initial assault was overwhelming,
with several hundred HARMs fired in the first few hours of the campaign. USAF Maj Gen
Glosson, director of campaign planning, reportedly stated that at this point during the
assault, no less than 200 HARMs were enroute to their chosen targets (a total close to
2,000 rounds were fired throughout the conflict).
This weight of numbers would not have been achievable without the
US Navy, which had wired its F/A-18s, A-6Es, A-7Es and EA-6Bs for HARM, in the USAF
inventory carried only by specialised F-4Gs and modified Weasel supporting F-16Cs;
accordingly the Navy claim that no less than 80% of the HARMs fired in the initial attack
came off USN launch rails.
To further incapacitate the Iraqi C3 network, which due jamming
would have to revert to land line communications, many of the cruise missiles were
targeted at electrical power stations and distribution yards, a large fraction of the USN
cruise missiles dispensing rather than submunitions spools of conductive carbon-fibre wire
which caused massive and repetitive electrical short circuits. The effect was to cripple
those communications and command facilities which did not have standby (backup) power
systems, and those repeatered links which operated on mains grid power.
Deception was added to the game plan. The USAF's 4468th Tactical
Reconnaissance Group launched groups of Northrop BQM-74 Scathe Mean drones against the H-2
and H-3 airfields, Basra and Baghdad (see AA Sept 92). Flying from Saudi territory, the
drones took up station in the vicinity of the targets and flew in loose formations,
pretending to be inbound bombers. The Iraqi SAM operators attempted to engage and
instantly attracted HARMs from waiting Weasels and Hornets.
The USN expanded this aspect of the SEAD campaign by launching
large numbers of TALD (Brunswick Tactical Air Launched Decoy) unpowered gliding decoys to
seduce the Iraqis into firing off their limited SAM stocks, so successful were the TALDs
that the Iraqis obstinately maintained, well into the campaign, that they had shot down
several hundred Allied aircraft. Again the decoys created an opening for HARM shots.
Another benefit of the use of such decoys, particularly with the static SAM systems, is
that it forces the expenditure of ready rounds on launchers, leaving a time window of
several minutes or more during the reloading of the launchers, when the battery is
defenceless against air attack and has already blown its position.
The centralised structure of the IADS collapsed inside the first
hour of the assault and Iraq's fate was sealed thereafter. This did not however prevent
the Iraqis from using their point defence weapons and some of the area defence weapons,
with which they continued to threaten Allied aircraft with SAM launches and AAA fire.
What followed was a systematic and sustained war of attrition
against the remaining radars and area defence and point defence SAM systems, which were
repeatedly attacked with HARMs and in many instances, RAF BAe ALARMs.
The principal targets of this second phase of the SEAD campaign
were the static and particularly mobile area defence SAMs, which had the capability to
engage aircraft at high and medium altitudes, outside the coverage of point defence SAMs
and AAA. It is interesting to note the general rule in modern SEAD campaigns, which is
strike at the longest ranging systems first and then work down to the lesser systems,
leaving point defences for last. In doing so, one eliminates first those systems with the
greatest capacity for airspace denial, thus giving oneself ever increasing freedom of
movement to engage the less capable systems.
Interestingly, this strategy matches well with the strategic air
attack model employed by the USAF, in that it first suppresses strategic area defences and
leaves the mobile area and point defences of the deployed army for last, ensuring always
that the defences will be forced to engage by virtue of attacking their defended sites.
The Allied SEAD and jamming campaign yielded truly Lanchesterian
results, with Iraqi radar, communications and SAM activity collapsing by an order of
magnitude in days. While SEAD and jamming aircraft continued to escort Allied strike
packages throughout the campaign, the number of missile launches and radar activity
dwindled with ongoing time as attrition took its toll, and Iraqi SAM and radar operators
refused to light up their radars for fear of being hit.
A feature of the following weeks was an effect observed many
times in the latter phase of the Vietnam Linebacker II campaign, the desperate firing of
SAMs without any guidance signals. With a P[k] approaching zero, this tactic probably
serves the sole purpose of bolstering the defenders' morale.
An interesting aspect of the opening phase of the SEAD campaign
was an attack by Army AH-64 Apache helos with Hellfire laser guided missiles against a
pair of critical early warning radar sites in Southern Iraq. Eight aircraft of the 101st
Airborne were led almost 400 NM deep into hostile territory at nap of the earth altitudes
by a pair of USAF MH-53J Pave Low III helicopters of the 20th SOS (1st SOW) which used
their comprehensive navigation and comms equipment to ensure the Apaches found their
targets, a colocated Squat Eye and Flat Face, and a Spoon Rest, which were then hit with a
total of 15 Hellfires at the specified time, just prior to their would be detection of
inbound Allied aircraft. We can conjecture that these low band systems were specifically
targeted to ensure that the inbound F-117As were not detected before arriving at Baghdad.
Concurrently with the opening moves in the SEAD campaign, Allied
interdictors hit key Iraqi air bases, cutting runways and taxiways to prevent all air
movements where possible. From a theoretical perspective, these raids fall as much into
the counterair campaign as into the SEAD campaign, an interesting parallel to the above
noted hits on C3 facilities. This illustrates the essential need for concurrency in any
air war, the strategic interdiction, electronic combat(EW+SEAD) and counterair campaigns
being complementary in their effects and in their purpose.
The Allied electronic campaign was an unprecedented success and
has finally laid to rest the myth of the invincible IADS. It is proof of the correctness
of Western electronic combat doctrine vs the doctrine of the West's now defunct opponent.
It is of some interest to draw parallels to the Allied assault on Festung Europa and the
collapse of the Third Reich's air defence system, for the Russians obsession with
emulating Germany politically translated into a surprising adherence to visibly obsolete
patterns of thinking about air and electronic combat, directly derived from Luftwaffe
doctrine. History has, to some degree, repeated itself.
