Russian Navy's Needs: Hard To Justify
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent emergence of
the 'new-world order', along with the progressive weakening of the
Russian economy, has hit what was already a fragile Russian Navy.
Finding it difficult to justify its raison d'être, the navy struggles to
obtain funding to ensure combat readiness, equipment maintenance and
long-term development.
The Strategic Deterrence Forces' guarantee of nuclear retaliation
remains the main national priority. Similarly, with mounting concern
over emerging potential threats from 'near abroad' countries such as
Chechnya, the army and air forces have had a clear role to play.
The naval case was more difficult to present. The Soviet Navy was
developed during the Cold War as a maritime counter to NATO; this
organisation, however, is no longer deemed politically hostile. The
navy today is unable to make a significant contribution to the growing
number of small regional conflicts in which Russia is involved.
As a result, naval planners have concentrated their assets on the two
primary governmental directives: strategic deterrence; and defence of
the Russian sea lanes. To do so the navy has optimised its core combat
capabilities, yet retained its traditional concept of layered defence
operations in a somewhat more diluted form.
Most of the current naval budget goes towards the nuclear-powered
ballistic missile (SSBN), nuclear-powered attack (SSN) and nuclear-
powered cruise missile (SSGN) submarine fleets. Despite this focus the
number of SSBNs has fallen sharply from 62 in 1990 to only 18 this
year. These include two Typhoons, two Delta Is, seven Delta IIIs and
seven Delta IVs. Six Typhoons originally were introduced, but four were
withdrawn from service because of the expense of maintaining the boats.
The remaining Delta Is are nearing the end of their operational lives;
they are expected to be decommissioned next year.
Most of the SSBNs are in the Northern Fleet, Russia's main naval
operating area. The rest are in the Pacific Fleet although these are
expected to be withdrawn soon; in this case the few remaining
operational units will be transferred to the north.
The fact that training standards have fallen means low morale has hit
even the elite branch, which is generally better motivated than other
naval personnel. This has been brought on in part by the low
serviceability; at present only one SSBN can be maintained on deterrent
patrol from each fleet area. This stems from a fleet-wide lack of
dockyard support that affects submarines and surface ships alike.
Refits and basic engineering work has fallen far behind schedule as the
navy strives to pay dockyard staff.
New construction is minimal. The first Borey-class SSBN is under
construction, but it is unlikely to enter service until 2008 because of
slow progress. It was expected that the Borey-class submarines would
use a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), designated SS-N-
28. But Western sources now believe this programme has either been
delayed or cancelled and that the boats will enter service fitted with
either a naval variant of the SS-27 or the SS-N-23 (NATO reporting name:
'Skiff') SLBM or even a modified version of the SS-N-23 SLBM called
'Sineva'.
The SSN element comprises 29 boats including eight Akula Is, two Akula
IIs, eight Oscar IIs, one Sierra I, two Sierra IIs, seven Victor IIIs
and one Yankee Notch. Like the SSBNs, most of the SSNs are in the
Northern Fleet. Operational patrols are generally conducted near the
Russian mainland, although SSNs and SSGNs in recent years have
conducted longer-range excursions, taking up station on the east and
west coasts of the USA near US SSBN bases. The SSNs and SSGNs have
attempted to trail US submarines and aircraft carriers.
The first Yasen-class SSN/SSGN is under construction at Severovinsk.
This advanced multi-purpose submarine uses the SS-N-27 anti-ship
missile in vertical-launch system silos and SS-N-15 ('Starfish')
missiles, which can be fired as part of a weapon mix from its torpedo
tubes. The first boat is expected to enter service in 2005. A ninth
Oscar II is also due for launch, but there is some doubt as to whether
it will be completed.
Eighteen non-nuclear-powered submarines remain in the Russian order of
battle. Most of these are based with the Northern and Pacific fleets,
with some in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. The conventionally-powered
Lada/Amur submarine programme is also under way at St Petersburg. It is
a sophisticated design with a very low acoustic signature. Armed with
533mm torpedoes or mines, it may in future be retrofitted with the SS-N-
27. The boat also has the option to be fitted with an air-independent
propulsion fuel cell plug, which would greatly improve its snorting
cycle. The first two units are due to be launched next year.
The surface fleet is in poorer shape than its submarine counterpart. On
initial inspection its inventory appears impressive, comprising nearly
80 major warships including one aircraft carrier; 160 minor combatants;
24 amphibious ships and 70 mine countermeasure vessels. Very few of
these warships, however, are combat-ready. The carrier, Admiral
Kuznetsov, for example, has rarely put to sea in recent years and its
air group has only minimal experience in deck operations. The rest of
the surface fleet shares a similar fate and many hulls are slowly
rotting in port. Recent intelligence sources have estimated that the
navy's current operational total readiness might be as low as 10%, in
stark contrast to a figure seven times higher at the height of the Cold
War. New construction for surface combatants is effectively non-
existent.
In February Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir
Kuroyedov said he intended to deploy an aircraft carrier group to the
Mediterranean within the next 12 months. He more recently said it would
happen by year-end.
The Russian Naval Air Force is an essential component of the fleet's
combat capability. The Tupolev Tu-22M ('Backfire'), the force's primary
aircraft, exists to conduct missile attacks against major surface units
in concert with near-simultaneous launches by submarine and surface
ship firings. The Sukhoi Su-24 ('Fencer'), Su-25 ('Frogfoot') and Su-27
('Flanker') fighters conduct shorter-range attack and air defence
missions, while the long-range Tu-95 ('Bear-D') bomber carries out
reconnaissance missions. The Tu-142 ('Bear-F'), and to a lesser degree,
Ilyushin Il-38 ('Mays') and Beriev Be-12 ('Mails') conduct area
anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Shipborne and shore-based ASW helicopters
support these. However, the maritime air arm is poorly maintained and
pilots on average fly 40 hours annually.
The naval export market is weak: only four hulls are in the pipeline. A
Slava-class cruiser, under construction since 1984, may be sold to
Ukraine. The one Grom-class frigate, Novik, has been authorised for
sale, but it is still only 20% complete three years after the keel was
laid. A second Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer is due to be
delivered to China in December, and three modified Krivak-class
frigates are under construction for India in St Petersburg.